Time for Netanyahu to launch a full Oct. 7 inquiry

In a low-key ceremony at the headquarters of the Israeli military last week, Chief of the General Staff Herzi Halevi, who commanded the army during the calamitous Oct. 7 Hamas massacre and its aftermath, was replaced by Eyal Zamir.

Although Halevi announced his departure some time ago, it was fitting that the ceremony should take place shortly after an investigation by the Israeli military released a report admitting what we all know — that it “failed in its mission to protect Israeli civilians.” But what shockingly emerges from the details of this failure is that the entire catastrophe could have been prevented.

In the same week, an investigation by Shin Bet, the internal security service, also revealed that, for several years, the organization had failed to identify Hamas’ plan to attack Israel. And not because of a lack of the necessary information, but because it believed that Hamas was under control. Yet, it still warned the government against complacency regarding the intentions of this Islamist organization, regardless of any specific attack plan.

As such, these conclusions amount to nothing that we could not have deduced by ourselves. However, these powerful and honest investigations by two of Israel’s most crucial security organizations, in addition to Mossad, are beginning to assemble the jigsaw puzzle that ought to provide a full picture of the truth. They will also enable any identified shortcomings to be fixed for the sake of preventing any such future catastrophes, as well as allowing Israeli society to begin its healing process.

What shockingly emerges from the details of this failure is that the entire catastrophe could have been prevented

Yossi Mekelberg

The task of the military is to defend its citizens and borders from enemy attacks and the naked truth is that it failed in the most colossal manner, with immeasurable consequences for the Israeli people, the Palestinians and the region as whole. As we might have expected, many senior commanders have already taken responsibility and retired from service. Yet, not one politician — first and foremost Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu — has been prepared to admit any responsibility for the failure to defend their own citizens. Instead, in their audacity, they have portrayed themselves as victims of a system that deliberately led them to fail, which is a complete absurdity.

Calamitous strategic surprises with far-reaching consequences are not unknown in history. Pearl Harbor and Operation Barbarossa, both during the Second World War; the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990; and, in Israel’s case, the coordinated attack by Egypt and Syria in 1973, are just a small sample of such surprises. What they all have in common — beyond the element of surprise — is that, despite ample warning signs, it was misperceptions and preconceived ideas held by decision-makers at the political and military levels about the intentions of the attacker and their capabilities that led to calamity.

The Israeli military and Shin Bet have done the only thing that you could expect of organizations that have failed those whom they had a duty to protect in such a spectacular, tragic way: they have thoroughly investigated how they suffered such an eclipse of judgment regarding their enemy.

Until Oct. 7, Israelis believed that, regardless of Hamas’ ill intentions and even its capabilities, the border between Gaza and Israel was impenetrable. Only two years before the Hamas attack, Israel completed a barrier that featured a sensor-equipped underground wall, a 6-meter-high above-ground fence and a barrier at sea with monitoring equipment to detect incursions from the water at a staggering cost of $1.1 billion. This security fence was even equipped with remotely controlled weapons systems and an array of radar systems with cameras that covered the entire territory of the Gaza Strip.

Who could have believed that, not only would it take less than an hour to make this obstacle obsolete, but also that the Israeli forces would take so many hours to reach the communities on the border and those at the Nova festival while people were being massacred. The soldiers in the bases and the civilians who carried weapons fought heroically to stop the waves of attack, but the failure of the senior command to take seriously warnings from spotters in the days and weeks leading up to the attack — and put all the bases on high alert and mobilize more troops — beggars belief.

The most basic maxim in this kind of scenario, “better safe than sorry,” eluded them. This was because of a combination of dogma, complacency, arrogance and groupthink, let alone a lack of discipline when procedures that should have been activated due to suspicions were ignored.

Shin Bet’s inquiry did not pull any punches regarding the government’s role and Netanyahu’s personal misjudgment

Yossi Mekelberg

The military investigation focused on its own conceptual and operational failures and was careful to avoid linking itself directly with the responsibility on the political level. Yet, the divisions in Israeli society caused by the government allowing foreign money to finance Hamas set the conceptual framework for assuming that Hamas was pacified.

Unlike the military probe, Shin Bet’s inquiry did not pull any punches regarding the government’s role and Netanyahu’s personal misjudgment that contributed to Oct. 7. It is not that the organization and its head Ronen Bar relinquished their own responsibility, but for the first time they formally stated that allowing money to be funneled to Hamas, with the encouragement of Netanyahu, as a way of maintaining “quiet” in Gaza, was a major factor in building Hamas’ military capability and a crucial factor that enabled Hamas to prepare for the attack.

Moreover, Shin Bet officials had, prior to that day, warned their political superiors that “we are entering an unstable period” and that only by proactive action against Hamas, including targeting its leadership, would Israel avoid being pulled into another round of fighting. One can question the legality and the effectiveness of targeted assassinations, but it is fair to assume that Netanyahu and his Cabinet colleagues were ignoring these warnings.

In the Knesset chamber last week, Netanyahu suggested that the findings of such an inquiry would be “predetermined” against him. This reflects both his paranoia and calculated evasiveness. Playing the victim could hardly wash in this case and the person at the top of the pyramid is always responsible when things go so disastrously wrong, but here he also set the policies and instructed the security forces how to operate.

The only decent thing the prime minister can do for the memory of those who lost their lives and their families, as well as those taken hostage, is ensure that the full truth about whose mistakes led to this calamity is thoroughly sought out and investigated by an apolitical state commission of inquiry — immediately.

Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg