Palestinian Authority stands at a crossroads

It is a sad irony that during this, the most acute period in Palestinian history, when there is such an urgent need for a strong and capable Palestinian Authority, one that could unite the governance over the West Bank and Gaza, it is barely functioning.
Palestinians themselves have given up on it, and the Israeli government cynically continues to object to it taking over the running of affairs in Gaza while weakening it in the occupied West Bank. This is a short-sighted attempt to prevent Palestinian self-determination from ever materializing.
That the PA is in need of fundamental reform is indisputable, even by the admission of its own leadership, and consequently in July last year it signed a letter of intent with the European Commission that acknowledged the need for urgent reforms, a need that had only grown as a result of the war in Gaza.
Palestinians have been expressing their sense of dismay about the authority; in a poll carried out by the Ramallah-based Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 49 percent of respondents in the occupied territories supported the dissolution of the PA as a means of breaking the current deadlock.
Worse, however, is the fact that support for those who lead it is almost nonexistent. Circumstances have inevitably rendered the PA unfit for purpose and unable to meet the current enormous challenges the Palestinian people are facing.
When it was established in 1994 by the Oslo Accords, the PA was designed to be a temporary governing body that would, in time, become a full-fledged government when a final status agreement was reached, based on a two-state solution, whereby all outstanding issues between Israelis and Palestinians would be resolved. More than 30 years later, this has not happened, leaving the PA in limbo; a governing body but not a government, and not in control of much of its territory and people.
Furthermore, an election in the occupied territories for the office of president last took place in 2005, and for the Palestinian Legislative Council the following year. Two decades later, the legitimacy of those elected back then has completely diminished.
The victory of Hamas in the 2006 legislative elections ultimately resulted in one of the most damaging developments for the Palestinian cause: the complete political separation of the West Bank, governed by the Fatah-led PA, and Hamas-governed Gaza. Since then, any attempts to heal the divisions between the two sides have repeatedly failed.
On top of this, the West Bank has been operating under an oppressive occupation and constant pressure to comply with Israeli demands; more than 60 percent of that territory is completely controlled by Israel, and even areas that are not are subject to the whims of the occupiers, such as Israel’s decision to end the transfer of tax revenue it collects on behalf of the PA as agreed in the 1994 Paris Protocol.
While such developments create a very difficult environment in which to deliver good governance and leadership, they are merely mitigating factors to the shortcomings of the PA itself, which has been tainted by incompetence, become increasingly authoritarian, and been less than transparent about the handling of public money.
When a new Palestinian government was formed last year, it pledged to introduce measures to improve transparency and fight corruption, to overhaul the justice system and security sectors, and to improve public-sector efficiency. Some progress has been made. However, for objective reasons, such as the war in Gaza and the deteriorating security situation in the West Bank, and also because of resistance to change from within the authority’s institutions, the reforms are far from complete.

The appointment last year of Mohammed Mustafa to lead a government of technocrats was a step in the right direction.

Yossi Mekelberg

Moreover, years of cuts to international aid, in addition to Israeli authorities withholding the Palestinian taxes they collect, have financially crippled the PA, resulting in the deterioration of public services and dwindling economic activity.
For many years the international community has exhibited a duality in its relations with the PA; it did not want to see its demise, given the lack of a viable alternative, but at the same time did not want to make the necessary investments to rescue a political body it perceived as unpopular and corrupt.
Hence, the international community has helped keep the PA just barely afloat, ensuring only that it does not completely drown, not least because of its cooperation with Israeli security forces on counterterrorism efforts, cooperation that is perceived by many Palestinians as collaboration with Israel in efforts to curtail legitimate resistance to the occupation.
The end result is now that there is an urgent need for a fully functioning PA to take over the running of Gaza, it has neither the competencies, leadership, nor public trust to do so, never mind the strong objections from the Israeli government.
However, the appointment last year of Mohammed Mustafa to lead a government of technocrats was a step in the right direction, as was the decision to establish an independent fund to oversee the reconstruction of Gaza, something that is still to be implemented.
As a consequence of the losses suffered by Hamas during the war, which have severely weakened it, let alone the disaster it brought upon its own people (without removing from Israeli authorities any of the responsibility they bear for the disproportionate response to Oct. 7), a reformed PA with new leadership could reclaim its role in Palestinian society.
Hamas is not going to disappear as an idea, or even as a movement that still enjoys some level of popular support. But if allowing Hamas to participate in elections was a huge task before the events of Oct. 7, it is almost impossible in the aftermath, and most certainly not possible with the group in its current form.
It is not only Israel that opposes the participation of Hamas, but also Washington, most of Europe, and regional powers that see the group and what it represents as a threat to stability and any future peace process. Nevertheless, without the representation of all factions within Palestinian society it will be hugely challenging for any new political system to claim broad legitimacy.
This dilemma must be resolved also for the sake of receiving much-needed foreign aid. Last year’s Beijing Declaration, in which 14 Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, agreed on a process of reconciliation between the two main groups, and recent talks during which they agreed to establish a government of technocrats after the war ends, demonstrated that creative solutions can yet be found.
The PA, like Palestinian society as a whole, finds itself at a crossroads now that the people of Gaza have suffered their worst disaster since the 1948 Nakba. But from the depths of this tragedy can emerge an opportunity to rebuild the PA with a new leadership, elected by the people, that is capable of meeting the challenge of uniting Palestinian society, reconstructing Gaza, and negotiating a peace with Israel based on a two-state solution.

• Yossi Mekelberg is a professor of international relations and an associate fellow of the MENA Program at Chatham House. X: @YMekelberg