The Syrian Kurds’ post-Assad dilemma

The Syrian Democratic Forces find themselves in an increasingly perilous position. For nearly a decade, the group has controlled large chunks of eastern Syria, after allying with the US to help defeat Daesh. With Damascus under Bashar Assad too weak to force the region back under its rule, the Kurdish-dominated SDF was able to carve out an unofficial statelet under Washington’s protection. However, Assad’s fall last month and the return to power of Donald Trump has put the Kurdish-led autonomous region in jeopardy.

Despite having no love for Assad, after he and his father spent decades marginalizing Syria’s Kurds, the dictator’s fall still leaves the SDF in a difficult position. Russia and Iran’s support for Assad had given the SDF two quiet advantages. Firstly, Moscow had proven effective at restraining Turkiye. Ankara sees the Democratic Union Party, which is known as the PYD and leads the SDF, as a terrorist entity given its links to the PKK. It has launched several invasions capturing pockets of PYD-held Syrian territory.

Secondly, Russia and Iran’s presence had given the SDF some leverage over Washington. The SDF could claim to be a bulwark not only against a resurgent Daesh, but also a way of preventing Russia or Iran from extending their control over all of Syria. The SDF enjoyed good ties with Russia and some of its leaders dangled the possibility of reconciling with Assad via Moscow to gain greater favor from the US.

With Assad gone and Russia and Iran’s role now hugely diminished, these advantages have evaporated. On Turkiye, the SDF fears nothing will hold Ankara back. At the same time as Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham launched the offensive on Aleppo that precipitated Assad’s departure, the Turkish-led Syrian National Army captured more territory from the SDF. Since then, there have been more clashes. Even though Ankara is currently exploring a dialogue with the PKK at home, the SDF fears Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan could yet push forward with his long-stated goal of driving the SDF 30 km back from the Syria-Turkiye border, or even destroy them all together.

Trump’s return to the White House compounds these fears. With Russia and Iran out of the picture, the US is even more vital to the SDF. Yet Trump’s commitment is questionable. In his first term, Trump unexpectedly declared that all US forces would be leaving Syria and greenlit Erdogan’s offensive to push Kurdish fighters out of a 100-mile stretch of land along the border.

Though Trump was persuaded to partially reverse this withdrawal, the SDF fears that he will once again order the removal of the remaining 2,000 US troops, leaving the group exposed. Days after Trump’s election, his ally Robert F. Kennedy Jr. reiterated that the president-elect wanted to withdraw, exacerbating these fears. Also at play is a perception that Trump is close to Erdogan and might be persuaded to give Turkiye a free hand.

These developments have narrowed the options available to the SDF. One strategy is to reconcile with the new government in Damascus and it has already explored this option. The SDF’s commander, Mazlum Kobane, met with Syria’s de facto ruler Ahmad Al-Sharaa in December, reportedly proposing that the SDF become autonomous within the new Syrian army, akin to Iraq’s Peshmerga. Oil, water and agriculture from eastern Syria would also be shared, rather than all flowing to Damascus as before the war. In a sign of his openness to a deal, Kobane has even begun displaying the Syrian revolution’s flag beside the SDF banner in interviews.

But there are serious obstacles to any detente. Firstly, it is unclear whether Al-Sharaa and HTS would accept Kurdish autonomy. The proposal could create an area similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq and HTS, which ruled Idlib in a centralized way, may oppose this. Al-Sharaa could also opt to wait, hoping to consolidate power in Damascus and then be able to drive a harder bargain from a stronger position.

It is also unclear how much ground the SDF is willing to give. Earlier in the conflict, the PYD and the Al-Nusra Front, HTS’ former incarnation, fought on several occasions and the two ideologies — one hard-line conservative Islamist, the other secular leftist — are diametrically opposed. The SDF also worries about HTS’ closeness to Turkiye, Al-Sharaa’s top foreign ally. Some former Turkish officials have argued that Assad’s fall means Al-Sharaa can now dismantle the SDF without Turkiye having to use military force — comments that will make Kobane wary of trusting the new regime in Damascus.

One strategy is to reconcile with the new government in Damascus and it has already explored this option.

Christopher Phillips

An alternative strategy would be to hold out for autonomy irrespective of Damascus, relying on foreign support. The US would be key and the SDF will be pleased that incoming Secretary of State Marco Rubio has already warned Erdogan against military action. Kobane further boosted his position by travelling to Irbil this month to meet Masoud Barzani, soothing long-running intra-Kurdish tensions. With Barzani enjoying good ties with both Turkiye and the US, it may be hoped he can help persuade either Erdogan to hold back or Trump to stay. The SDF has also built informal ties with Israel as another source of foreign support, most likely hoping that pro-Israel voices in the US can pressure the White House to maintain a US presence in Syria.

But this remains a risky approach, depending as it does on Trump’s willingness to stand fast in eastern Syria. His unpredictability could prompt a sudden withdrawal, placing the SDF in trouble. Waiting until Washington goes could leave the group with a terrible hand to negotiate with Damascus, but making concessions to HTS before then, when Trump might yet stay, could also prove costly.

The SDF has survived against the odds over the last decade, but the new regional environment it finds itself in could prove an even greater test than the trials it has already overcome.

• Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of “Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.” X: @cjophillips