Lebanon looks back, but is April 13 best forgotten?

Do we really have to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the start of the Lebanese civil war? We are still too busy still thinking of the more recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, and we are not even sure it is over yet. More importantly, the people who fought each other in that so-called civil war are now the staunchest of allies in a political confrontation with Hezbollah about its arms and its role in the current war. What is the point of reminding them that at one point they were killing each other?

Memory, as the philosopher Bashshar Haydar explained, is internalized. This ideally means that past events are digested and what remains are the useful lessons, with the useless toxic bits discarded. Historically, the Lebanese norm is a form of amnesia, but ignoring a painful past also means a desire to move on, a will to forgive and forget, of looking forward instead of back. The point is to take measures for it not to happen again, and there are many popular proverbs that support this attitude of “turning the page,” “mention it but never repeat it,” “stuff it in the saddle bag,” and ignore it.

This is not South Africa with truth commissions and accountability, unsure how it helps the healing if you have to reopen old wounds. Accountability also needs a clear picture of the guilty party, which may not help if you have to find a way of living together again. Clarity is also overrated — each side deals with the truth in their own way, and there develops a common language.

After the 1860 massacres in Mount Lebanon there was an agreement that “what is past is past” and the parties resisted European suggestions of separate cantons. The result was a formula for coexistence that remains to this day, a council with representation from all communities, and where none can dominate over the others. This was repeated over the years: in the constitution of 1926, the National Pact of 1943 and the Taif agreement of 1989.

The Lebanese love their freedom to the point of anarchy

Nadim Shehadi

In 2005, during the Cedar Revolution, demonstrators asked for the truth and for accountability via a UN-sponsored investigation and a Special Tribunal for Lebanon. But when the truth came and was confirmed by the tribunal, it was too hot to handle and was quietly ignored. Nobody is asking for accountability; the truth became a memory, and was internalized, and we moved on.

Agreements are, of course, always broken, and they are repaired or patched up with slogans such as “no victor and no vanquished“’ after 1958, “one Lebanon and not two,” or the Baabda Declaration of 2012 where the different parties pledged to recuse themselves from following their instincts to interfere in the Syrian war and respect Lebanese sovereignty. This was again broken by Hezbollah, which not only joined the action in Syria, but also dragged the country into another destructive war with Israel.

A new generation seems to think differently and is asking. what is wrong with us? Hezbollah did not exist before 1982, so it cannot be the only problem. They are asking for a radical revision of the system almost to the point of destroying it. The revolt of October 2019 had a nihilistic and populist bent to it; the masses were shouting slogans against the whole political class, political parties, banks, the economic system, and the power-sharing formula which they describe as sectarianism. Some even ask for a strong leader, an Ataturk or a benevolent dictator because we have all failed and deserve no better. What they seem to be asking for resembles nothing in Lebanon.

But my hope is that through these discussions they will end up appreciating their history better and maintaining the spirit of the power-sharing formula that characterizes the country. What makes me optimistic is that sometimes there is a difference between what people think, what they say, and what they end up doing. The best way to understand this is to observe what is happening now.

Hezbollah is not being held responsible — there are no calls for accountability for the destruction, deaths and human suffering that resulted from a war that it chose to wage with no consultation with the rest of the country. It is not being asked for damages; the whole country is accepting it will assume responsibility for reconstruction. Instead Hezbollah is being encouraged to apply the Taif Agreement by disarming and joining the political process. It is a subconscious repetition of the old slogans, letting bygones be bygones, “the past is past,” there are “no winners and no losers,” and there is “one Lebanon, not two.” During the war this fall, displaced Hezbollah supporters were received with open arms, even in the areas that opposed it most.

Those who fought each other are now the staunchest of allies

Nadim Shehadi

It is almost like a selective memory is paving the way again for an eventual amnesia, forgetting what happened and moving on. Even though it sounds like I am advocating against the commemoration of April 13, I find one reasoning for doing so to be valid, that of historian Makram Rabah of the American University of Beirut. Rabah, who specializes in memory and oral history, advocates for the commemoration in order to avoid the misuse of memory by spoilers and trouble-makers. This does not necessarily mean that there should be an official common account of history, but of a continuous discussion of a variety of perspectives.

One danger is that an official version of a common history has sometimes accompanied the call for memory. This is done with the best of intentions — such as the aim to maintain social cohesiveness and preserve national unity, sovereignty, and equality among citizens, similar to Kemalist Turkiye. This can, in fact, hinder a positive discussion, with anyone who thinks critically of the official version then accused of fomenting division and becoming a threat to national unity and social cohesion. Then the common version becomes like an oppressive big brother-type narrative, with its own vocabulary that no one can question.

Another obvious conclusion to avoid is that there is a zero-sum game between freedom and security. The Lebanese love their freedom to the point of anarchy. But when chaos sets in, they become more accepting of authority to the point they also tolerate limits to their freedoms. The argument is that both the PLO in the 1960s and Hezbollah as states within a state were regional phenomena which could only flourish in Lebanon because of the weak state and excessive freedom. Neither could have succeeded in an authoritarian society such Assad’s Syria or Saddam’s Iraq, but we should also avoid moving toward seeing them as desirable models.

• Nadim Shehadi is an economist and political adviser. X: @Confusezeus