Syrian violence could benefit Israel and Iran

The deadly clashes in Syria are a sad reminder that the transition away from Bashar Assad’s rule may not prove as peaceful as many initially hoped. Hundreds of people were reportedly killed in the Syrian coastal region over the weekend, when clashes between pro-Assad forces and the new government escalated into sectarian violence.

Reports suggest a series of planned attacks on government security positions sparked the unrest, launched by pro-Assad officers from Assad’s Alawite community who have refused to disarm and hope to initiate an insurgency. Security forces called for reinforcements, but among the fighters coming to their aid were radical sectarian Islamists, who targeted Alawite civilians as well as the insurgents. The exact number of people killed remains disputed, with the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claiming as many as 1,000, mostly civilians.

The new government, as well as ordinary Syrians, were left reeling by the unexpected violence. In a speech on Sunday, Syrian Arab Republic President Ahmad Al-Sharaa praised his security forces while condemning the pro-Assad fighters that wanted to “drag our country into a civil war, with the aim of dividing it.” He promised that those who had harmed civilians would be held to account, while promising an investigation. But there is no disguising that this is a blow for the new regime, challenging Al-Sharaa’s promises that, despite his Al-Qaeda roots, Syria’s different communities will be safe.

While it is unclear how things will play out domestically, internationally the violence brings further problems. Al-Sharaa has tried to woo foreign governments, including in the West, since toppling Assad in December, particularly hoping for much-needed foreign investment and sanctions relief to ease the burden on Syria’s flailing economy. Yet, on the same weekend as these efforts appeared to be making progress, with The Economist urging Western states to drop sanctions on Syria, these attacks broke out. With US Secretary of State Marco Rubio quick to condemn “radical Islamist terrorists” for murdering civilians, the already uphill battle of getting Washington to ease sanctions may have gotten even harder.

In contrast, most of Syria’s neighbors, notably Turkiye and many Gulf states, have emphasized their support for the new government and its security forces in the battle with the remnants of the Assad regime. But it is two other regional powers that will be most boosted by these events: Israel and Iran.

Ever since Assad’s fall in December 2024, Israel’s government has sought to increase its influence in southern Syria. Soon after Assad’s flight, Israel occupied the demilitarized zone abutting the occupied Golan Heights that Israel captured in 1967, taking its army to just 25 km from Damascus.

Israel’s justification for doing so is twofold. Firstly, to ensure its own security. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu regards Al-Sharaa and his Hayat Tahrir Al-Shams-dominated government as radical Islamists that could either threaten Israel directly or grant others like Hamas the opportunity to do so. With this in mind, Netanyahu in February called for the “complete demilitarization of southern Syria … from the forces of the new regime.”

Ever since Assad’s fall in December 2024, Israel’s government has sought to increase its influence in southern Syria

Christopher Phillips

Israel’s second justification is to protect Syria’s Druze community, especially those concentrated around the southeastern city of Suwayda. Syria’s Druze have never shown much love for Israel and historically were loyal fighters in Syria’s wars against it. But Israel’s Druze, in contrast, are fully integrated into Israeli society and military and many have lobbied the Israeli government to ensure their Syrian co-religionists are safe.

Netanyahu therefore also stated in February that “we will not tolerate any threat to the Druze community in southern Syria.” Whether this is a genuine concern from Netanyahu or a ploy to justify intervention in Syria, it creates further problems for Al-Sharaa after the violence on the coast. For Israel, the killing of Alawite civilians fits its narrative that HTS and its allies are vengeful extremists that will target all of Syria’s non-Sunni minorities, and that the Druze might be next.

Already, after the fighting at the weekend, Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Israel Katz told Damascus in a joint statement that, “if the regime harms the Druze, it will be harmed by us.” Plans have reportedly been drawn up to defend Jaramana, a Druze-dominated suburb of the Syrian capital. Some, such as Turkish scholar Ali Bakir, have argued that Israel wants to see Syria become a failed state, fragmented along ethno-religious lines, which would make it less threatening to Israel and easier to influence and control. If such an agenda exists, then sectarian violence like that seen this weekend only helps it.

The other beneficiary from the violence is Iran. Since Assad’s fall, his former allies in Tehran have been frozen out of Syria. Despite the billions they invested in propping up the former dictator, and the high cost in lives, Iran lost all its bases, investments and its land route connecting allies in Iraq and Lebanon. Al-Sharaa’s new government has been cool to say the least, listing Iran as the only state, other than Israel, not to be granted entry visas.

But Iran is believed to retain connections to former Assadists in Syria. There was no clear evidence that the fighting last week was orchestrated by Tehran, though Turkiye did say it believed “unnamed foreign elements” were partly to blame, while Iran’s Foreign Ministry was quick to deny any involvement, stating on Monday that “any killing or action against civilians is condemned and unjustifiable.” Even so, like Israel, Iran has an interest in developments.

On the one hand, it wishes to ensure the Alawites remain safe in post-Assad Syria. Should that be a tactic Iran and members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps opt to follow, the sectarian killing over the weekend could serve as a valuable recruiting tool for fearful Alawites.

Despite their differences, Israel and Iran could both benefit from instability and sectarian fighting in Syria and any failure of Al-Sharaa to oversee a peaceful transition.

• Christopher Phillips is professor of international relations at Queen Mary University of London and author of “Battleground: Ten Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East.” X: @cjophillips