Trump, Modi and the new partnership

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington on Feb. 13-14 took place against the background of Donald Trump’s threat to impose crippling duties on imports from India, in response to the $45.7 billion trade deficit in India’s favor.
To improve the atmosphere, before Modi’s arrival, India announced steep reductions on selected items imported from the US. However, the atmosphere was seriously soured by US flights to India carrying Indian illegal immigrants in shackles.
At the outset, Modi sought to revive the bonhomie and warm personal chemistry he had enjoyed with the president in his first term through a play on words, recalling Trump’s slogan, MAGA, Modi said his own slogan was “MIGA,” Make India Great Again, and pointed out that the merging of the two slogans led to “MEGA — a mega opportunity for prosperity.”
This play on words appears to have shaped the content of the joint statement, which indicates that relations between the two countries would be based on a series of acronyms that are unbeatable for their verbosity.
The full range of bilateral cooperation will now take place within the rubric of the “US-India COMPACT for the 21st century,” the acronym standing for “Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce and Technology.” Defense industrial cooperation will be shaped by “ASIA,” the Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance, while technology cooperation will occur through “TRUST,” which stands for Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology. Partnership in technological innovation, unsurprisingly, needs another acronym, “INDUS Innovation,” which itself is modelled on the earlier “INDUS-X” platform. Finally, trade will be promoted by the “BTA,” the Bilateral Trade Agreement that the two countries will finalize later this year.
The joint statement also sets out in minute detail every piece of military equipment the US has supplied India and what it hopes India will buy in the near future. It promises that Indo-US trade will, under Mission 500, go from $130 billion today to $500 billion by 2030. Energy cooperation will flourish so that the US emerges as “a leading supplier of crude oil and petroleum products and LNG (liquefied natural gas),” even as India obtains US-designed nuclear reactors.
In the defense area, the militaries of the two countries will march together “in multilateral settings to advance global peace and security,” with a particularly “close partnership” in the Indo-Pacific and in the Middle East. In respect of the latter, India and the US will convene partners from the India-Middle East-Europe-Economic Corridor and I2U2 (India, Israel, the UAE and the US) “to announce new initiatives in 2025.”

India’s engagements with the US may be expected to be transactional, with the verbosity of the joint statement remaining delusional — full of sound and fury, signifying very little.

Talmiz Ahmad

Modi’s visit has thrown up several positives for India. The US interest in expanding military sales to India has ensured that not only will India have access to state-of-the-art military equipment and technologies, it will also gain expertise through domestic production in selected areas. Similarly, the US could emerge as a major partner for India in the diverse areas of technology as well as the exploration, development and use of critical minerals. India will also benefit by obtaining technology for light-water nuclear reactors that now dominate the global nuclear scene.
However, trade is likely to remain a contentious issue between the two countries; the target of $500 billion for bilateral trade by 2030 can be achieved only if India, regardless of price, commits itself to buying American military equipment, energy resources and technology, and denies itself access to other competitive sources. This will impose an unacceptable burden on India and will need a firm pushback.
The visit also revealed some important areas of concern for India. The language of the joint statement is generally one-sided and appears to place India as a junior partner in support of US strategic interests. This is reflected in references to US interests in the Indo-Pacific and even the Indian Ocean that are obviously directed at confronting China in these spaces. Given that India shares 3,200 km of undefined border with China, it hardly suits Indian interests to be part of a US-led military coalition directed at China.
Similarly, the joint statement refers to the Middle East in language that takes no account of India’s commitment to strategic autonomy. Specifically, while India has close ties with Israel, it continues to uphold the need for a “two-state solution” to address Palestinian aspirations. Now, given the deep divide in Arab and Israeli positions after Gaza, India can hardly associate itself with the US in convening a meeting of the IMEEC partner states this year.
Above all, India is well aware of the frequent changes in US policy approaches, and the influence of extraneous elements on its policymaking. To this we must add Trump’s unpredictability, his propensity for grandstanding, and his lack of interest in pursuing a longer-term vision — all of which make the US an extremely unreliable partner. This is most recently in evidence with regard to Ukraine and the exclusion of European countries from discussions relating to their own security.
Thus, India’s engagements with the US may be expected to be transactional, with the verbosity of the joint statement remaining delusional — full of sound and fury, signifying very little.

• Talmiz Ahmad is a former Indian diplomat.